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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this article is to predict the support the Islamist Ennahda Movement will 
enjoy in the Tunisian parliamentary elections on October 23. In order to this, a literature 
review has been conducted that establishes the context of the Ben Ali regime and its 
dealings with Ennahda before the revolution; the motivation behind the Jasmine 
Revolution (and the role played by Ennahda); and Ennahda’s present roles and activities 
in Tunisia. It will be shown that despite heavy-handed repression of Ennahda by the Ben 
Ali regime that resulted in the liquidation of the Ennahda movement within Tunisia, and 
the decidedly un-Islamic nature of the popular uprisings, Ennahda has returned to 
Tunisia one of the strongest contenders for the October parliamentary elections. These 
findings suggest that although there is widespread fear and distrust of the Islamic 
movement within Tunisia, the party’s brand of “soft Islamism” and apparent 
commitment to the ideals that motivated the revolution, Ennahda are likely to remain key 
contenders for the October elections, and will continue to influence and interact with 
Tunisia’s post-revolution political landscape.  
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THE FUTURE OF TUNISIAN ISLAMISM: THE CASE OF ENNAHDA 
 
This article’s analytical agenda is to assess what role and to what extent the Ennahda Movement will influence 
the political arena in Tunisia following the Jasmine Revolution. Ennahda gradually emerged in Tunisia 
throughout the 1970s, originally as The Islamic Tendency Movement (MTI, Movement de Tendance Islamique), 
and it is important to understand the context surrounding their involvement in society, and their relationship to 
both President Bourguiba, and later President Ben Ali, if their current role a post-revolution Tunisia are to be 
fully understood. Ennahda’s leader, Rachid Ghannouchi, who was one of the founders of the movement, and 
whose belief in the democratic framework and its compatibility with Islamic values has meant that he has 
maintained a high profile as a leader and an Islamic scholar. It will be shown that whilst the Ennahda Movement 
had very little involvement in the 2011 popular uprisings that began in December 2010, and that whilst the party 
experiences widespread apprehension and distrust, they have become one of the strongest and most influential 
political parties in Tunisian politics. Thus, the analysis will make a general conclusion that whether Ennahda 
achieves success in the short-term through parliamentary elections in October 2011, or whether their influence 
will grow and manifest over a longer period of time, the movement will remain key players in post-revolution 
landscape of Tunisian politics provided they remain committed to democratic process, modernization, 
supporting women’s rights and political and personal freedoms.  
 
Islamists have been the focus of state violence and hostility in both the Bourguiba and Ben Ali regimes but they 
have also been placed at the centre of political consciousness in Tunisia. Bouguiba’s increasing hostility and 
violence towards Islamists and his insistence on a retrial of eighty-nine Islamists arrested in 1987 and the 
imposition of the death penalty for all suspects, prompted Prime Minister Ben Ali to assume power under 
Article 57 of the Constitution, fearful of a possible breakdown in public order.1 Bin Ali’s declaration on 7 
November 1987, immediately after the coup, which promised democratic reform and Islamists participation 
must be understood in this context. The new government moved quickly to legitimize the regime, garner support 
from the Islamists and to resolve issues that formed the catalyst of mainstream Islamist opposition, namely the 
lack of political expression, economic opportunities, moral laxity, corruption and mismanagement.2 
 
Measures implemented that sought to legitimize the regime and garner Islamist support included abolishing The 
State Security Court, used by Bourguiba to trial Islamists and other opposition forces, most political prisoners 
were released including over 600 MTI members, in May 1988 he pardoned its most prominent leader, Rachid 
Ghannouchi and in September, he allowed the group’s secretary-general, Abd al-Fattah Mourou to return home 
from exile.3 Islamists were also allowed to take part in the Islamic High Council and to establish the Islamic 
Student Union.4 Ben Ali also instituted other symbolic measures such launching an Islamic ethics campaign, 
which increased surveillance of cafes, malls and other public places to prevent ‘un-Islamic’ behaviour and Islam 
was given a more visible presence in everyday life through the broadcasting of the call to prayer and religious 
programs and increasing the use of Islamic references in official rhetoric.5 Furthermore, symbolic changes such 
as the presidential prize for Qur’anic learning, and Ben Ali’s highly publicized pilgrimage to Mecca as his first 
trip as President were part of a concerted drive for symbolic re-Islamisation of the RCD and of Tunisian society, 
whilst simultaneously undercutting Islamist appeal.6  
 
The accommodation of Islamists was short-lived. Electoral competition in the lead-up to the April 1989 
elections marked a turning point in the process of escalation between Ennahda and the government.7 According 
to unpublished government polls, Ennahda candidates polled over fifty per cent in some constituencies in the 
1989 elections, and officially won 14.5 per cent of the vote nationally, and as much as thirty per cent in some 
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major cities.8 This meant Ennahda polled second only to the ruling party, the RCD.9 Although the Islamists fell 
short of popular victory, they confirmed their position as the main power contenders and opponents to the 
regime.10 Their success during the parliamentary elections and were alarmed at their increasing profile and the 
expansion of their support and Ben Ali became adamant that religion and politics should be kept separate,11 
insisting that “no single group should monopolize the claim to be Islamic since all Tunisians are Muslims.”12 In 
1990, Article 8 of the Constitution was changed to prohibit political parties based on religion, thus re-banning 
Ennahda, as well as six other opposition groups, and prevented them from participating in the June 1990 local 
elections.13 On 21 May 1990, the Minister for the Interior announced there would be clampdown on opposition 
following the discovery of Islamic cells within the security forces and a five-phase plot against the regime, 
which resulted in a spiral of repression that swiftly neutralized the Islamist opposition.14 State regulatory and 
control policies were tightened, civil society organizations were infiltrated by party members and an array of 
measures designed to promote women’s labor rights and their status in the family were introduced to give 
support to the regime’s progressive image.15 The suppression of Islamists was also presented as a security 
concern that was needed to safeguard the economic gains of tourism and foreign investment.16 The government 
drew links between Islamists and was able to reject Islamists as unpatriotic, as subverting religious and national 
unity and placing the country in danger while attempting to illegitimately monopolize the common good.17 
Ennahda, as the most influential Islamist actor, were the focus of government campaigns against Islamism, 
whose membership was punishable by up to five years imprisonment.18 
 
An attack by Ennahda militants on an RCD office in February 1991 marked a turning point in which the 
Islamists lost the battle for public opinion and were abandoned by other opposition parties.19 Three months later, 
some of Ennahda’s leaders were accused of plotting to overthrow the Ben Ali regime after alleged plots, 
assassination plans and arms caches were apparently discovered by the regime.20 Ghannouchi denied the 
existence of such plans, arguing it was an excuse for the government to crackdown on his group; he went into 
self-imposed exile in London in protest.21 By 1991, the level of repression was greater than that experienced 
during the Bourguiba era and it had become clear that ‘the government had succeeded in isolating the movement 
through the gradual process of exclusion and delegitimisation.’22 The success of the government in exploiting 
the event and establishing a link between Ennahda and terrorism, and with its main figures, including leader 
Rachid Ghannouchi, either in jail or in exile overseas, political Islam effectively disappeared from the political 
stage in Tunisia by the end of the year.23 In June 1996, Ennahda organized its first congress overseas in Belgium 
in order to evaluate their strategy and it was decided that its culture of confrontation should give way to a more 
moderate policy.24 
 
Whilst living in exile in London, Rachid Ghannouchi remained an influential Islamic scholar. According to 
Tamimi, ‘Ghannouchi's main interest has been to stress the need for democracy, to prove its compatibility with 
Islam.’25 Whilst Tamimi’s glowing endorsement of Ghannouchi in Rachid Ghannouchi: A Democrat within 
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Islam might need to tempered by the knowledge of his Islamist orientation, evidence of Ghannouchi’s (and 
mainstream MTI/Ennahda’s) commitment to the democratic framework and non-violence can be found since 
1981.26 However where this commitment is put into question is with regards to the long-term ambitions of the 
movement; whilst adamant that they must work within the democratic framework in order to advance their 
goals, it stems from the belief that an Islamic society or state cannot be imposed but must be rebuilt gradually 
through participation in institutions that can be reformed.27 Ennahda’s social and political goals have remained 
rather nebulous, because whilst with a clear intent to influence public policy in a way that is consonant with 
their vision of Islam, and that there is a need to reform the understanding of Shari’a so that it is able to better 
respond to the modern questions and problems (thus not denying the imposition of Shari’a), they have stated 
they do not seek to monopolize political expression, for this only replaces one dictatorship with another.28 
Ghannouchi’s later writings argue that Shari’a provides a broad set of guidelines that are compatible with 
democratic governance, and that democracy is needed in order to implement to Islamic concept of Shura, 
meaning consultation between the political authority and the people.29  
 
After two decades of one-party rule, it was not the Islamist movement that finally toppled the Ben Ali regime to 
become the first of the “Arab Spring,” but rather grew out of a native desire for democracy, human rights and 
opportunity. Roy argues that the ‘Jasmine Revolution’ should be considered a revolt, rather than a revolution, 
because the uprisings had no leader, no structure and no political parties who were promising to undertake the 
task of anchoring democracy.30 The self-immolation of Mohammad Bouazizi, a computer science graduate 
frustrated by a lack of employment opportunities, sparked the popular uprising that used social media sites such 
as Facebook and Twitter to organize and mobilize; activism was framed by calls for democracy, personal and 
political freedom and economic opportunity.31 With forty per cent of the population under twenty-five years of 
age, Chrisafis notes, ‘The curse of unemployment and the young generation’s distrust at corruption were key to 
the protests that ousted the dictator.’32 Indeed, Rachid Ghannouchi concurs, ‘A quarter of a million unemployed 
graduates—that’s the basis of this revolution.’33 That the Jasmine Revolution would be inspired by these 
circumstances is historically consistent; whilst rebellion against power as an end in itself has not been a feature 
of Tunisian history, its history is littered with uprisings against unjust rule over food or taxation, such as those in 
1864, and the bread riots of the 1970s and 1980s.34 Thus it could be argued that the political culture in Tunisia 
centers on paying deference to political rule provided it does not impinge on livelihood.35  
 
The December 2010 uprisings did not ‘spring’ from nowhere. Social tension and a growing disaffection with the 
Ben Ali regime were simmering long before the Jasmine Revolution erupted in December 2010. Larbi Sadiki 
identifies three recent crises that shook the regime and clearly demonstrated the democratic limitations of the 
regime as well as its human rights abuses.36 The first of these crises was the Bin Brik Affair in April and May 
2000, involving Tawfiq Bin Brik, a Tunisian journalist and correspondent for the French newspaper La Croix, 
whose showdown with the government over his harsh treatment for writing critical articles about the regime 
sparked a media frenzy both domestically and abroad, and was also responsible for galvanizing civil society 
support.37 Bourguiba’s death on 6 April 2000 prompted a national sense of grievance in Tunisia, but when the 
regime did not televise his funeral, apart from a few minutes on the main news bulletin, it prompted unrest in 
Bourguiba’s birth town of Montasir on the day of the funeral, during which anti-Bin Ali slogans were sung; the 
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mishandling of Bourguiba’s death also received wide media coverage abroad.38 Strained relations with France 
and the French media also served to put pressure on the Ben Ali regime. Whilst the French and Tunisian 
intelligence services had collaborated against ‘Islamists,’ the French eventually withdrew their cooperation, 
based on the lack of evidence to support accusations of terrorism leveled against Islamists in exile.39 French 
leaders were also more outspoken in their concern over the lack of substantive democratic reform in Tunisia and 
its media was particularly vocal in condemning the Tunisian government and President Ben Ali, leading to a 
strain in relations between the two governments.40 As Sadiki notes,41 these three crises differed in intensity and 
gravity but all presented Ben Ali and his regime with a crisis of confidence, posed questions about the 
democratic limitations of the regime and exposed the violation of citizenship rights and the tight control of 
media reporting. The crises also prompted protests and coalition building within civil society.  
 
Olivier Roy argues that the uprising in Tunisia reflects that of a post-Islamist generation. 42 Despite Ennahda 
being the strongest opposition force to the Ben Ali regime before the crackdown, the Islamists did not appear to 
be a leading force during the wave of protests that led to the downfall of Ben Ali.43 As Basly44 notes, ‘From 
1992 to 2011, Al-Nahda [Ennahda] was almost completely absent from Tunisia, and played no part in the 
overthrow of the authoritarian regime.’ Ennahda were the only party to not make an independent appearance 
during the protests, however The Al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb released a statement 
sympathizing with demonstrators and called for Shari’a law to be implemented.45 However protesters have 
largely rejected calls for Shari’a law to be implemented, as many advocate for a democratic system that 
separates religion and political demands.46 Furthermore, the murder of a Polish priest, Marek Rybinksi, an 
accountant at a private religious school near the capital has been attributed to “fascist terrorists with extremist 
attitudes” by the Interior Ministry; along with verbal attacks on Jewish people and Islamist protesters attempting 
to set fire to a brothel, has prompted hundreds of Tunisians to protest with posters reading, ‘Secularism—
Freedom and Tolerance’ and ‘Stop Extremist Acts.’47 Ennahda have strongly condemned these acts and in 
response to the murder of Rybinksi, have called on Tunisian authorities to discover the real circumstances of the 
murder and those responsible.48 Thus, the ‘Jasmine Revolution’ cannot be considered Islamic in character, but 
rather represents a broad-based call for democracy and human rights that was spread by a new Facebook and 
Twitter generation.  
 
After the fall of Ben Ali in January 2011, Rachid Ghannouchi announced that he would return to Tunisia to re-
launch the Ennahda Movement, accompanied by other memebers of Ennahda who were living in exile.49 
Thousands welcomed Ghannouchi to Tunisia on 30 January 2011, whilst a group of half a dozen protesters held 
up banners reading, ‘No Islamism, no theocracy, no Sharia, and no stupidity!’50 The number of supporters 
suggests that the group has maintained some of its popularity. Since Ghannouchi’s arrival, Ennahda has been 
legalized by, and accepted into, Tunisia’s interim government and has announced that the movement plans to 
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take part in the October 23 parliamentary elections, but will not field a presidential candidate51 and Ghannouchi 
also announced that he would not compete for any public offices.52 The Higher Authority for the Achievement 
of the Revolution Objectives, Political Reform and Transition to Democracy, the provisional government, has 
been tasked with enabling a democratic, sound and quiet transition until a Constituent Assembly is elected on 23 
October, along with members from other political parties, civil society organizations and other prominent 
figures.53 Ennahda have also opened dozens of local offices in preparation for the elections, and it is reported 
that imams are promoting Ennahda in Mosques.54 The party’s weekly newspaper, Al-Fajr (The Dawn), resumed 
publication in April after a twenty-year absence, and now sells around 70, 000 copies per week according to 
party officials.55  
 
According to many analysts and commentators, Ennahda are likely to emerge as one of the strongest and most 
influential parties in Tunisian politics after the October elections, which will determine the constituent assembly 
that will be tasked with rewriting the Constitution and deciding on the shape of the country’s future political 
system.56 Indeed, according to Sayare, ‘the Islamists of the once-banned Ennahda Party have emerged from 
obscurity, returned from abroad and established themselves as perhaps the most powerful political force in post-
revolution in Tunisia.’57  Polling suggests that Ennahda enjoys broader support than Tunisia’s other eighty-two 
authorized political parties, and stands to dominate the election.58 Some predict Ennahda may poll thirty-five to 
forty per cent of the vote, and is expected to do particularly well in the conservative south and in the 
impoverished interior.59 Ennahda have years of organizational experience, a vast membership and decades of 
credibility as an enemy of Ben Ali, and they have proved to be better-equipped than any other political party in 
Tunisia to step into the political void.60 Additionally, Ghannouchi is a respected Muslim scholar and is widely 
considered to be moderate with beliefs in the compatibility of democracy and Islam. This reflects Ennahda’s 
more moderate ideology and stance, with Ghannouchi and party leaders likening Ennahda to Turkey’s AK Party 
in that it accepts Tunisia’s Personal Status Code and the place of women as free agents in society, along with a 
reciprocal and equal coexistance with the west.61 Ennahda is also adamant that a non-clerical form of political 
Islam can exist with secular democratic politics.62  
 
Despite predictions that Ennahda are likely to enjoy widespread support during the elections, there are also 
many reports of widespread apprehension and distrust of the movement. The popularity and organizational 
strength of Ennahda is of growing concern for many, who fear that the secular revolution might result in the 
birth of a conservative Islamic government.63 For many, Ennahda’s modernist discourse is too good to be true.64 
Ibrahim Letaief, a radio host of the popular radio station Mosaique FM, said, ‘They’re doing doublespeak, and 
everyone knows it’ and is openly critical of the Islamists, arguing they are espousing a moderate rhetoric in 
order to win votes, but once in power they will impose strict Islamic law.65 This view is spurred by confusion 
over Ennahda’s stance on Shari’a law and the relationship between religion and state.66 Anti-Ennahda Facebook 
groups have tens of thousands of supporters, and protesters have denounced the party throughout Tunisia, with 
                                               
51
. S. Sayare, “Tunisia is Uneasy Over Party of Islamists,” The New York Times 16 May 2011: A9; A. J. 
Yackley, 2011, Update 2: Tunisia’s Ennahda party may join interim govt. 
http://af.reuters.com/article/tunisiaNews/idAFLDE7212GX20110302 Accessed 01.05.11.  
52
. Al-Suaydani, Al-Munji, 2011, Ennahda movement leader talks to Asharq Al-Awsat. http://www.asharq-
e.com/news.asp?section=3&id=24070 Accessed 01.06.11. 
53
. Basly, The Future of Al-Nahda in Tunisia. 
54
. Sayare, Tunisia Is Uneasy Over party of Islamists.  
55
. Ibid.  
56
. Ibid.; Steele, Tunisians known Ben Ali was not democracy’s only block.  
57
. Sayare, Tunisia Is Uneasy Over party of Islamists.  
58
. Y. Ryan, 2011, Challenges to Tunisia’s fast-track democracy. 
http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/features/2011/07/2011731123629555162.html Accessed 27.08.11. 
59
. Al-Alawsat, Tunisia’s leading Islamist to return from exile; Sayare, Tunisia is Uneasy Over Party of 
Islamists.  
60
. Sayare, Tunisia is Uneasy Over Party of Islamists.  
61
. Ibid.; Pitel, Triumphant return for Tunisia’s Islamist leader.  
62
. Ryan, Challenges to Tunisia’s fast-track democracy.  
63
. Sayare, Tunisia is Uneasy Over Party of Islamists.  
64
. Trabelsi, Ennahda Movement returns to Tunisian politics.  
65
. Sayare, Tunisia is Uneasy Over Party of Islamists.  
66
. Basly, The Future of Al-Nahda in Tunisia. 
11 
 
some fear associated with uncertainty about who will lead the party following the announcement that long-time 
leader, Rachid Ghannouchi, will not seek office and will step down as leader later this year.67  
 
Furthermore, following confrontations between Salafi-Jihadists, a militant faction within the Islamic Salafi 
movement who favour the strict implementation of Islamic religious law (Shari’a) based on a literalist 
understanding of the Qur’an and who reject the division of religion and state.68 Salafi-Jihadists believe that 
Muslims must actively engage in jihad, understood in its aggressive form, until an Islamic state has been 
established on as large a territory as possible.69 A car bomb outside La Ghriba Synagogue in Djerba in 2002, 
confrontations with Salafi-Jihadists in December 2006 and January 2007, as well as rumors of attacks on 
unveiled women, artists, bars and brothels since the revolution, has led to a growing fear that Muslim radicals 
will increase their presence in Tunisia.70 For some, these fears may have proven to be legitimate with increasing 
action being taken by “conservative Islamic groups” such as by Salafist supporters who attempted to storm a 
university in Sousse, 150km south of the capital on 8 October and two protests on October 9 in Tunis.71 One of 
the Tunis protests was in response to the closure of a Mosque near Tunis university (and which was once a 
hotbed for activism early in Ben Ali’s reign) and the other involved around 200 Salafists (who, according to Al-
Jazeera were mostly students) attempting to attack the headquarters of the private television station of Nessma, 
who aired an animated film depicting Allah, a practice that is forbidden by Islam.72 In the lead up to the October 
23 election there has been increasing tension between religious groups and secularists, who fear their liberal 
values are under threat, especially since latest polls indicate that Ennahda are expected to win the largest share 
of the vote.73  
 
Competing claims of both widespread support and widespread resistance to Ennahda makes predicting what 
role, and to what extent political Islam will influence the political arena following the Jasmine Revolution 
difficult. A fault line has developed between those who want an Islamist form of governance, and those who 
wish to maintain Tunisia’s secularist past.74 Of those polled in a July 2011 Al Jazeera poll, twenty-one per cent 
of respondents said they would vote for Ennahda, followed by the Progressive Democratic Party (PDP) with 
eight per cent and the Tunisian Communist Workers Party with five per cent.75 In terms of political ideology, 
forty-seven per cent of the Tunisians polled said they strongly agreed with political Islam, nineteen per cent with 
Arab nationalism and liberalism, whilst six percent identified with communism or socialism.76 Thus, it is clear 
that Ennahda has emerged from over twenty years in exile to become one of the most prominent, discussed and 
debated aspects of Tunisian politics. Due to this, whether Ennahda achieves success in the short-term through 
the October parliamentary elections, or whether their influence grows and manifests over a longer period of 
time, they are likely to be key players in the Tunisian political scene. This may be enhanced by Ennahda’s 
relative experience and organization and the weak, fragmented and unorganized nature of many of the eighty-
two parties currently registered, many of whom only came into existence in early 2011.77 Considering Ennahda 
was the strongest opposition to the Ben Ali regime before their repression in the early 1990s and that they have 
an existing support base, combined with their emphasis on the values that propelled the ‘revolution,’ it is 
possible that a significant proportion of the population will support Ennahda.  
 
In the short-term, it can be predicted that political Islam, in the form of Ennahda, will have a significant role in 
the October 2011 parliamentary elections, and that it will only continue to influence and interact with Tunisian 
politics. Whether Ennahda’s brand of soft Islamism can and will communicate with Tunisia’s new generation 
remains to be seen.78 Success will depend on the Ennahda’s commitment to the principles that motivated the 
revolution, particularly democracy and human rights and their position on the relationship between religion and 
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state, particularly the implementation of Shari’a. According to Allani, Ennahda’s political life depends on three 
main principles: Firstly, that they accept the framework of the national state; second, they agree to safeguard the 
tradition of modernization in Tunisia, and; third that they adopt progressive attitudes towards Arab and Islamic 
identity.79 Should they deflect from these principles, Ennahda will be relegated to the ‘political cold.’80 
However, it is also possible that Ennahda’s presence and support will decrease as new parties increase their 
public profile, develop policies and a well-defined political orientation. Ennahda’s support has historically 
stemmed from an opposition movement to an imposed secular regime, which is contrasted to the political 
climate of Tunisia today, where a multitude of parties are able to operate freely and openly, and thus may lose 
its appeal. How Ennahda responds to the more conservative or radical elements within Islamism will also have a 
bearing on their long-term success, with many distrusting their commitment to democracy and the principles 
that propelled the uprisings, fearing an Islamist government will result in the rise of radical Islam and an end to 
the secular state.  
 
In conclusion, it is clear that although Ennahda had very little involvement in the revolution, and that there is 
widespread apprehension and distrust of the party, they will play a significant role and have a continued impact 
on Tunisian politics. It has been shown that the movement was the strongest opposition to the Ben Ali regime, 
who through a process of exclusion and de-legitimization were able to neutralize the Islamist challenge and 
liquidate the Ennahda party in the early 1990s. Despite this, the party has returned to Tunisia after two decades 
of absence, as one of the strongest contenders for the October parliamentary elections. Based on their level of 
support, their moderate attitude and commitment to the principles that motivated the revolution, it be predicted 
that Ennahda will continue to play a significant role and have an impact on Tunisian politics in the years to 
come. 
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